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In this paper, a model of product innovation is developed that endogenizes the
degree of cooperation. Two opposing forces affect firm profit in an R&D joint
venture. Cooperation increases the quality of the product but it also makes the new
products more similar. The increasing substitutability of the product intensifies
competition in the production stage. Thus, it may not be optimal to share all of the
product information. The basic model is altered to allow for a joint-selling agreement
and for tariffs or transport costs. Firms are found to increase R&D cooperation if
they are protected from product market competition.
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1. Introduction
Cooperative research and development is the topic of an extensive body of
economic and business literature
1. The existing literature provides valuable insights
into welfare aspects and motives for cooperative R&D. However, despite the large
number of papers, the vast majority of models are based on process innovation.
Process innovation has, of course, its rightful place in the R&D agendas of many
firms. Businesses undertake efforts to develop new technologies or to change their
production organization in order to reduce the cost of producing their current
products. However, if we look at firms’ business strategies, product innovation
seems to play a much more prominent role. Product development is vital for
companies to remain competitive in their current market, to add to their product line,
to penetrate existing or create completely new markets. Several databases such as the
INSEAD
2 database or the MERIT-CATI database with over 7000 agreements
attempt to document cooperative agreements between firms. Although the data are
not systematic with respect to motivations for, incidence of, and implications of
cooperative agreements, it appears that the majority of such agreements involve
product development.
3
Product innovation is not only important empirically. It also invites the
researcher to look at cooperative R&D from a different angle. Price competition
1 A review of this literature can be found in Veugelers (1998).
2 European Institute of Business Administration, Fontainebleau, France
3 Hergert and Morris (1988)3
seems the more realistic form of competition after a new product was developed
instead of the standard Cournot analysis mostly used for process innovation. In the
context of price competition and product development, it becomes important whether
or not the firms produce a homogeneous product. However, what kind of product is
produced should depend on how closely the firms cooperate in its development.
Previous work has studied process innovation assuming that firms either cooperate
and share all of the R&D outcome or that they do not cooperate at all. Keeping in
mind that real-life firms forming a research and development joint venture (RJV) can
write contracts in which they specify to what extent they will cooperate in R&D, it
seems natural to assume that the degree of cooperation is endogenous
4.
In this paper, a model of product innovation is developed that allows for an
endogenous degree of cooperation between the partner firms. In a two-stage game,
firms decide how much information to share about the new product. The extent of
the cooperation determines the degree of product differentiation. In the second stage,
firms compete in prices. The paper addresses the questions of the optimal degree of
cooperation, the effect of cooperation on prices and quality, and the welfare aspects
of cooperation. The results of the basic models are compared to two alternative
scenarios: a situation in which firms are allowed to jointly sell the new product and a
two-country world with import tariffs/ export taxes.
4 Joanna Poyago-Theotoky (1994) introduces a model of product innovation in which quality can be
improved if firms cooperate. Cooperation implies that the firms jointly sell the new product, thus
reducing the number of available products.4
Why or why not do firms cooperate in the development of new products?
Looking at the business literature or the announcements of cooperative agreements in
the press it becomes apparent that there are numerous motives for firms to engage in
joint product development. One of the most prominent arguments is that firms join
forces to develop a higher quality product. Cooperative R&D might result in a higher
quality product through pooling of R&D resources, technological know-how,
consumer research, specialization etc. Cost savings or a minimum required
investment that exceeds the financial possibilities of a single firm are other
arguments for cooperation. Against all these compelling reasons for cooperation
stand arguments against it. The inherent danger of R&D cooperation lies in allowing
a competitor access to core technologies thereby potentially weakening the own
strategic position in the future. If the RJV is not allowed to market and sell the
product, i.e. firms will compete after the development phase is completed,
cooperation might increase competition by making the products better substitutes.
The fact that not all firms engage in cooperative R&D and that RJV partners also
tend to retain some independent R&D capacities indicates that there are at least two
effects pulling in opposite directions
5.
The model in this paper is based on the idea of improved product quality
through cooperative R&D, representing the pro-cooperation effect. Equivalently,
firms could develop the same quality product at lower cost. However, the quality
5 An observation that can support this argument comes from the IUI database “Activities of Swedish
Multinational Enterprises Abroad”. The data show that firms who are engaged in a RJV, tend to
allocate less than 100% of their R&D expenditure to the joint venture. This indicates that firms choose
to do some of their research independently.5
approach is chosen because developing a better product seems to be the more
intuitive story. In a simple world, there are two firms playing a two-stage game. In
the first stage, firms can do research and develop a certain new product. The product
is indeed new, not just a better version of an existing product. Examples of this type
of product innovation could be the introduction of TVs, VCRs, microwaves, video
cameras, copying machines, and PCs. The firms can choose to develop the product
on their own or to cooperate in R&D. Whether or not they cooperate, the firms will
compete in prices in the second stage. R&D cooperation affects the attributes/quality
of the product. Therefore, the firms can affect the demand side by cooperating. The
degree of cooperation is a choice variable for the firms. The decision on R&D
cooperation in the first stage determines the intensity of competition in the
production stage. As firms cooperate, their products become more similar
intensifying the competition in the production stage. The increased substitutability of
the product constitutes the downside of cooperative R&D.
Demand conditions play an important role in the model. Consumers favor
either one or the other firm and they incur switching costs if they do not buy their
preferred product. However, if the firms cooperate and the products become closer
substitutes, switching costs for the consumers are reduced as they perceive the
products as being more similar.
The main findings are that in equilibrium, firms sell a higher quality product
at a price that is higher than without cooperation but lower than the maximum
possible price. If switching costs can go to zero, firms will never fully cooperate. If
consumers’ valuation for the new product is high relative to the switching costs,6
firms will not cooperate at all. If firms are allowed to jointly sell the new product,
welfare can be larger than under product market competition. This somewhat
counterintuitive result arises because firms cooperate fully if they do not have to
compete selling the product. This cooperation does not only increase the price and
firm profits but it also results in the highest quality product.
The following section describes the model in detail. Section three and four
analyze the price game in the second stage and the choice of the degree of
cooperation in the first stage, respectively. In section five, the basic model is
extended to allow for tariffs in a world where the firms are located in different
countries. Section six concludes.
2. The Model
The following section translates the scenario described above into a simple
model based on consumer switching costs. An alternative approach using a
“Hotelling” type location model is described in the Appendix.
2.1. The Firm Side
There are two firms that do not currently compete in the same market. The
firms intend to develop a new product, which is unrelated to their current products.
This ensures that they do not pursue any strategies that relate to their current market
or products. The new product consists of many parts, say n components. The R&D
cost for the new product is fixed and equal to F for both firms. The components can
be ordered from one to n according to some technical characteristics. Each firm can7
develop its own n components and complete the new product. In that case, the
products perform the same basic function but remain incomplete substitutes.
Assume that firms A and B are equally capable of developing the product as
a whole, but the quality and production technology of the components varies
between the firms. For example, if the new product is an airplane, firm A might be
an expert on wing design and fuel systems but firm B has the better expertise on
cockpit electronics and landing gear hydraulics. The firms can cooperate such that
they compare the components and use the ones that are of better quality (or less
costly produced). The firms decide up to which component number they share
information.
An Example
•  100 components n=100
•  Firm A could develop all 100 parts on its own: a1,a 2,…, a100
•   Firm B could do the same: b1,b 2,…, b100
If both firms decide to complete their product on their own, the result would be
“Product A” and “Product B” which consist of completely different parts but are
incomplete substitutes. This situation represents the maximum degree of
differentiation.
On the other hand, firms could choose to share information on a certain
number of components, say the first 45 components such that both products contain
the same first 45 parts and after that the firms add their own components.8
a46,a 47,…,a 100 Product A
c1,c 2,…,c 45
b46,b 47,…,b 100 Product B
The percentage of common components will be called α and α is defined as the
degree of cooperation.
6
2.2. The Demand Side
As mentioned earlier, it seems that many products that come to mind when
thinking of cooperative R&D are durable goods, which are bought in small
quantities. Therefore, in this model consumers buy at most one unit of the new good.
A consumer buys either from firm A, from firm B, or not at all. Consumers’
valuation for the product is uniformly distributed in an interval from 0 to u.T h e
quality of the product increases with the degree of cooperation. Therefore, u is an
increasing function of α ,h ( α ) with 0 ) ( h and 0 ) ( h
2
≤
α ∂ α ∂
α ∂ >
α ∂
α ∂ ,e . g .u =1 + α .T h i s
could be seen as follows: Each consumer i has a valuation uiwhich equals ui
0 if firms
do not cooperate. The valuation increases with the quality of the product. As the
6 Of course there are many alternative ways of modeling cooperative product development. One could
imagine that firms are free to choose the optimal degree of product differentiation along with the
degree of cooperation. In this paper, however, the focus will be on a situation in which the degree of
product differentiation is determined by technological constraints. Examples that might fit this
situation are described in Degryse and Irmen (1996). One example is car manufacturing. To achieve
better gas mileage, cars are made more aerodynamic but only certain shapes guarantee better
aerodynamics. Hence, by improving this quality aspect of cars, the cars become more similar in their
appearance.9
quality is affected by cooperation, an individual’s base utility increases with the
degree of cooperation such that ui(α )=ui
0(1+α ). The ui
0 are uniformly distributed
among consumers, which results in a uniform distribution of the uibetween 0 and u.
Consumers have brand loyalties, which could be interpreted as consumers
having switching cost s. Those switching cost could arise if the firms are located in
different regions, A and B. A citizens have usually bought from firm A and would
like to continue buying there. Similarly, B citizens feel that firm B products best
satisfy their needs. Therefore, some consumers prefer to buy from firm A and some
from firm B but if the competitor’s price is low enough, they will buy from the other
firm. The loyalty depends on the perceived difference between the products, i.e. on
α . As firms cooperate, their products become more similar, decreasing switching
costs for consumers. Hence, switching costs are a decreasing function of α , s=k ( α )
with >
≤











Consumers valuation: u ~ unif [0 ; u] !
u
1
) u ( f = where u=h ( α )e . g .u=1+α
Switching cost: s ~ unif [0 ; s] !
s
1
) s ( g = where s=k ( α )e . g .s=1-α
3. The second-stage price game
Solving the game backwards, we begin with the price game in the production
stage. Given preferences and switching cost, the demand for the product of each firm
can be derived using the following table. It describes the buying behavior of the10
people preferring firm A (called A citizens) and firm B (called B citizens). The
two groups are of measure one each and are identical except for their preference for
one firm.
A citizens B citizens
Case pA≤≤≤≤ pB
buy good A u ≥ pA u ≥ pA+s a n d
u-pA-s > u-pB
! pB-pA >s
buy good B _u ≥ pB and pB-pA ≤ s
Case pA ≥≥≥≥ pB
buy good A u ≥ pAand pA-pB ≤ s_




Given the described buying behavior, the demand function for firm A is
7:
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Similarly for firm B.
8
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The first term is the demand in firm i’s “own” market. The second term
represents the demand taken away from firm j, i.e. people who would have bought
from j but now buy from i because of the lower price. The third term is the additional
demand from firm j’s market, that is, people who would not have bought the product
from j at pj but they buy from firm i. In this case, pi+s<u but pj>u. If the prices of the
two firms are equal, both serve their “own” customers only.
It should be pointed out that in this model firms are not allowed to price
discriminate between consumers of the two markets. This assumption is not
problematic if we think of a situation in which switching costs arise from consumers’
brand loyalties or if consumers live in different regions of one country such that
firms cannot distinguish between customers and arbitrage is easily possible. The12
assumption will be carried over into section 5 that introduces tariffs into the game.
In a two-country world it is more disputable to assume that firms cannot charge
different prices in the two markets. However, the extension of the model to allow for
price discrimination will be left for future research
9.
For computational convenience and without loss of generality the production
costs of the new product are assumed to be equal to zero. Then the profit functions of
the firms are F Q * p A A A − = Π and F Q * p B B B − = Π .
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8 The demand functions for firm B are found in the Appendix.
9 In a different context, a comparison of the cases with and without price discrimination in a switching
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The system of equations has a unique solution in the relevant parameter space. Only













s * p * p p + − + = = =
Proposition 1: There exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the second stage price
game with both firms charging the same price. In equilibrium, no consumers switch.
The equilibrium price is increasing in the switching costs and the maximum utility
value
11.
Substituting the specific functional forms α − = 1 s and α + = 1 u into the
equilibrium price, we can see that the price is a concave function of the degree of
cooperation. For [ ) 2 . 0 , 0 ∈ α p* is increasing in α, reaching its maximum at α=0.2
10 This is the price obtained from solving the first order conditions for firm i if pi≤pj. The price of the
other firm, pj for pi≤pjis equal to
2 2 2 2 2 2
*
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s h o w nt oe q u a lp ifor s≥0, u≥0.
























and decreasing for ( ] 1 , 2 . 0 ∈ α . In the next section, the first stage of the game is
studied. It will be shown that the optimal degree of cooperation does not maximize
the price in the production stage.
4. The R&D Stage
The following section is divided into three subsections. In the first
subsection, the first stage of the game is solved for the optimal degree of cooperation
using the specific functional forms α − = 1 s and α + = 1 u . It follows a discussion
about how the characteristics of the equilibrium depend on the functional forms. The
subsection on welfare effects compares the solution of the basic game to a social
planner’s solution as well as a situation in which the joint venture can sell the new
product as a monopolist.
4.1. Choosing the Optimal Degree of Cooperation
When choosing the optimal degree of cooperation, α*, the firms take the
second-stage equilibrium profits as given. Due to the symmetric nature of the
problem, α* that maximizes joint profit also maximizes profit of the individual firm.









 − = Π . Using the second-stage equilibrium prices, we get
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Both s and uare functions of the cooperation variable α. Before solving for
the optimal α, it might be useful to isolate the effects of α on profit through the
switching costs and the utility. If we look at the partial derivatives of the profit
function with respect to α, taking either s or u as determined exogenously, we get
for constant u ), ( k s = α = :
(11)
2 2
2 2 2 2
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which can be shown to be negative for all 0
) ( k
with ) ( k <
α ∂
α ∂
α . As expected, if
utility were to remain constant, firms would never cooperate if cooperation reduces
switching cost. Similarly, if utility is an increasing function of α and switching costs
remained unchanged, firms would cooperate 100%
12.
Returning to question of the optimal degree of cooperation α*, initially let
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, 1 0 ≤ α ≤
To solve for α*, assume a specific functional form.
Assumption A1: α + = 1 u and α − = 1 s
Under A1, α* is the solution to
(13) ()
2 2
2 2 3 2
5 6 5 ) 1 (
5 6 5 2 4 6 5 7 17 13
0
α + α − α +
α + α − α − α − − α + α + α −
− = with 1 * 0 ≤ α ≤ .
α*=0.364
The optimal degree of cooperation α*=0.364 exceeds the price maximizing α of 0.2.
The resulting second stage price of 0.385 is higher than the price without
cooperation. Thus we have:
Proposition 2: Under A1, if firms are allowed to cooperate in R&D, they will offer a
higher quality product at a price that is higher than without cooperation but lower
than the maximum possible price.
Equilibrium profit is a concave function of α with its maximum at α*. One
implication of this is that there exists are range for the fixed R&D cost F in which
firms need to cooperate in order to innovate at all. For17
2 2 *) 1 ( *) 1 ( 4
* 1
* 1
F 2 5 α + + α −
α +
α −
< < − firms will innovate and produce the new
product only if they are allowed to cooperate.
The result in proposition 2 is limited to specific functional forms for the
maximum value of utility and switching costs. The next section investigates to what
extent the qualitative results depend on the functional forms.
4.2. The Role of Functional Forms
So far it was assumed that α + = 1 u and α − = 1 s , implying that the switching
costs approach zero as α approaches one. Furthermore, these functional forms also
fix the size of the impact cooperation has on consumers’ valuation and switching
costs. This assumption is now relaxed.
Assumption A2: α + = x u and α − = t s with 1 t , 0 x ≥ ≥
Recall that under A2, the individual’s utility is given by ui(α )=ui
0(1+α /x).
The parameter x in the utility function thus provides a measure of the relative
importance of cooperation for the consumer. Similarly, t represents the relative
importance of α for reducing an individual’s switching cost. Of course there is an
infinite number of alternative formulations so any specification is restrictive.
However, in order to get any results, a functional form has to be assumed. The goal
of this analysis is merely to develop a possible scenario for product innovation and to
draw some conclusions in the light of this limited framework.18
There is no closed form solution for α* for the generalized functional
forms α + = x u and α − = t s . Therefore, the derivative of profit with respect to α is
evaluated at the extreme points of α, zero and one. The questions to be answered are
when do firms cooperate and if so, when do they cooperate with α*=1, i.e. sharing all
of the R&D output. Furthermore, the effect of α on equilibrium price is determined.
Looking at the derivative of profit
13 at α = 0, we find that firms are unwilling
to cooperate if x is more than twice as large as t. In that case, the negative effect of
decreasing switching costs outweighs the positive effect of increasing quality. This
indicates that in markets where the valuation for the new product is high relative to
the switching cost, firms will pursue the innovation on their own. The equilibrium
price is a concave function of α with its maximum at x 5 / 2 t 5 / 3 − = α .I f 3 / 2 x / t <
the maximum equilibrium price is a corner solution at α = 0. Because the condition
3 / 2 x / t < is always satisfied in the case when α* = 0, the firms will charge the
maximum possible price without cooperation. For 466 . 0 x / t > firms will always
choose an α >0 .U pt o 3 / 2 x / t = the equilibrium price with cooperation will be
lower than without. For 3 / 2 x / t > , the price is higher than without cooperation but
it is never optimal for the firms to choose α to maximize equilibrium price. The
results are summarized in propositions 3 and 4:
13 See the Appendix for all mathematical details of this section.19
Definition:
Let p* = equilibrium price in the second stage price game
p*max= the maximum equilibrium price in the second stage price game
p0 = price without cooperation
Proposition 3: Under A2, firm behavior in equilibrium can be divided into three
categories depending on the relative size of t and x:
(i) t < 0.466x No cooperation, p* = p*max =p 0
(ii) 0.466x≤ t ≤ 2/3x Cooperation, p* < p0
(iii) t > 2/3x Cooperation, p0 <p *≤ p*max
Proof: See Appendix
For region (iii) it can be shown that the derivative of profit with respect to α,
evaluated at the α that maximizes price, is larger than zero for all t and x. Then it
must be the case that α* always exceeds the price maximizing α until α* is a corner
solution with α*=1. Only if α*=1 the maximum equilibrium price is reached along
the line t =5/3 + 2/3x. Proposition four states under what conditions firms will
choose to cooperate to the fullest extend and share all information.20
Proposition 4: Under A2, firms will never fully cooperate if switching costs go to
zero as α goes to one. Furthermore, for all t > 1.47 there exists an x
max such that for
all x with x
max > x > 0 firms will choose α* = 1, i.e. firms optimal degree of
cooperation is 100%.
Proof: See Appendix.
Firms’ cooperation decisions vary depending on the relative importance of
consumers’ valuations and switching costs, covering a wide range of equilibrium
prices and qualities. The next section describes and compares welfare implications in
two different organizational settings. One scenario is the game presented in the
previous sections in which firms cooperate in R&D but later compete in prices. The
other is a situation in which firms are allowed to jointly sell the new product. A joint
venture in the latter sense would be a separate entity developing and producing the
product acting as a single firm.
4.3. Welfare Analysis
Welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and firm profits. Recall
that the firms aim to develop a completely new product. Therefore, there does not
exist an alternative lower quality product and welfare is equal to zero if firms decide
not to develop the product.
14 Given demand in this market, welfare is equal to
14 A welfare analysis of a situation in which consumers could have chosen a lower quality product if
firms had not innovated is found in J. Poyago-Theotoky (1994).21
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The model is set up such that cooperation increases competition as well as the
value of the product to consumers.
15 Consequently, a social planner aiming to
maximize welfare in both regions would choose α
SP as high as possible. If the
s w i t c h i n gc o s t sg ot oz e r oa sα goes to 1, α
SP=1 implies that the new product has the
highest possible quality and the price is equal to marginal cost. This is a first-best
outcome with the only problem that firms, in order to innovate, have to be able to
recover their R&D expenditure. To solve this problem, the social planner could use
some mechanism to transfer money from consumers to firms in a non-distortionary
way to cover the R&D expenses. If that is not possible, α
SP could be chosen such that
the profit from the sales of the new product just covers the R&D cost.
It is more interesting to compare the outcome of the basic game in which
firms compete in stage two to an alternative scenario in which the joint venture is
allowed to sell the product. In this case, the RJV would act as a separate entity or
profit center. The problem of consumers switching from one product to the other
does not arise. As the firms’ profit is strictly increasing in α if there are no switching
15 As a direct result of the model setup, firms optimal level of cooperation always stays below the
socially optimal level unless α*=α
SP = 1. This model design is in accordance with results from a
large body of literature showing that private incentives for cooperation fall short of the social
incentives. See for example Choi (1993), Kamien et al. (1992).22
costs, firms will choose α = 1 and sell the product at the monopoly price (1)/2 u .
Then welfare under the joint selling arrangement, Wm,i sg i v e nb y ) 1 ( u 3/8 Wm= .T o
compare welfare under monopoly to welfare under product market competition,
W(α*), it is necessary to find the numerical solution for α* in order to calculate
W(α*). In the case of α − = 1 s and α + = 1 u we get the following result:
Proposition 5: Under A1, overall welfare is higher in the joint selling setup than
under product market competition. A reduction in consumer surplus is more than
offset by the increase in firm profits.
Proof: See Appendix.
This result might seem somewhat counterintuitive – product market collusion
that hurts consumers should not outperform competition in terms of overall welfare.
In the present case, however, collusion gives the firms the incentive to produce the
highest quality product. In the case of A1, where switching costs approach zero as α
goes to 1, the quality increasing effect of collusion on welfare outweighs the
negative price effect. Does this result carry over to other functional forms?
It is not possible to come to a general conclusion for A2 given that there is no
closed form solution for α*. But using the results from propositions 3 and 4, we can
compare welfare at the extremes of α, α*=0 and α*=1. If firms choose α*=1, demand
conditions are such that firms have enough incentive to develop the highest quality
product despite product market competition. In that case, consumers’ maximum
valuation under competition *) ( u α equals ) 1 ( u , the outcome under monopoly. As the23
competitive equilibrium price p*(α) is always less than the monopoly price,
welfare must be higher under product market competition.
Now let us turn to the case in which firms do not want to cooperate at all if
they compete in the product market. If α*=0, the jump in quality from competition to
collusion is the largest. It can be shown that there exists a region in the x-t-space
such that W(α*) < Wm if α*=0. Recall from proposition 3 that firms are unwilling to
cooperate if x 466 . 0 t ≤ .F u r t h e r m o r e ,a tα*=0 we have W(α)-W m < 0 if the
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These two conditions are represented graphically in Figure 1, which is
mapping out the x-t space for the functional forms in A2, α + = x u and α − = t s .
The purpose of the figure is to show the relative sizes of the parameter regions in
which W(α*) < Wm and α*=0, marked M, relative to the area in which product
market competition yields higher welfare (the striped area open to the right in Figure
1). Equation (16) is represented by the function labeled “W(α*) = Wm at α*=0”.
Given that α*=0, W(α*) > Wm to the left of this line. This division is only
meaningful in the area where α*=0, i.e. below the line t=0.466x and above t=1
16.T h e
size of area M compared to the stripe area W(α*) > Wm shows that for α*=0, given
any x-t combination, it is much more likely that product market competition leads to
higher welfare. This illustrates that the situation in Proposition 5, when a joint-
16 In order for switching costs not to become negative as α goes to one, it is necessary that t is greater
or equal to one.24
selling agreement increases welfare, is therefore just a special case that might
occur under specific demand conditions.
Figure 1: Welfare Comparison at α*=0
In general, the relationship between W(α)a n dW m under A2 depends on the exact
values for t and x, but the closer α*i st o1 ,t h em o r el i k e l yi ti st h a tW ( α*) > Wm.
5. R&D Cooperation under Tariff Protection
In this section, assume that firms A and B are located in two countries, A and
B, and each country has the opportunity to impose an import tariff. Note that the
analysis also applies to other situations of decreased competition between the firms.
The same effects would result from an export tax or a per unit transport cost that
each consumer has to pay. Tariffs are just chosen to represent an added per unit cost











along this line W(α*) = Wm at α*=0




wish to buy product B have to pay A’s tariff, tA, in addition to their switching
costs. Similarly, B citizens have to pay tB if they decide to switch. The introduction
of a tariff, which is equivalent to increasing switching cost per consumer by a fixed
amount, results in discontinuous reaction functions for the firms. The firms’ altered
maximization problems and the solutions are found in the Appendix. Figure 2
illustrates how the situation for the firms has changed with the introduction of a
tariff.
Figure 2: Reaction Functions with Tariffs
The discontinuous reaction functions shown in Figure 2 result because the
tariff provides a price range in which the firms can change their price without
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affect consumers in the own market without inducing any consumers to switch. In
particular, if A B A B B t p p t p + < < − ar e d u c t i o ni np A will not attract B customers
a n da ni n c r e a s ei np A will not result in A customers to switch to B as long as the new
price remains in the interval. Similarly, if B A B A A t p p t p + < < − ac h a n g ei np B will
not induce any consumers to switch. Let pA
high and pB
high be the prices that firms A
and B can charge, respectively, without triggering a reaction from the other firm. Let
p
m denote the monopoly price with 2 / u p
m = .
Proposition 6: For tA ≥ 0, tB ≥ 0, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the
second stage game with prices ( )
m high
A A p , p min p = and ( )
m high
B B p , p min p = .T h e



















As shown in the Appendix, pA
high is an increasing function of tA and pB
high of
tB. The import tariff imposed by the country in which the firm resides allows that
firm to charge a higher price in equilibrium. For a tariff higher or equal to
) s 4 u ( 2 u
2
+ , the firm can act as a monopolist. If B A t t ≠ , the equilibrium prices for
the firms will differ such that the firm in the country with the higher tariff will
charge the higher price. Even if prices are different in the two countries, there will be
no trade in equilibrium. If the prices and profits for the firms are not equal, the α that
maximizes profit for each of the two firms will be different as well. This introduces a27
new type of coordination problem for the firms. Although their cost structures are
identical, they now prefer different degrees of cooperation. The tariffs in the two
countries determine the equilibrium prices but the firms have to negotiate the extent
of their cooperation. One possibility for the firms is an agreement at the lowest
common denominator, i.e. firms choose the lower α that maximizes the profit of the
firm in the low-tariff country. Alternatively, the firms could choose α to maximize
joint profit and bargain over the gains. The bargaining game will not be modeled in
this paper. However, independent of the specific outcome of the negotiations we
know that prices will increase and α will be equal to or higher than its non-tariff
level
17. Ultimately, the firms’ agreement on the degree of cooperation will determine
to what extent the tariff affects welfare in each country.
The protection of the domestic firms by a tariff allows the firms to cooperate
more extensively, potentially offsetting part of the negative welfare effects of the
tariff by increasing product quality. It should be pointed out, however, that a
unilateral increase in t would inevitably raise the price in that country but might not
affect cooperation at all. If the other firm whose profit maximizing α remains
unchanged is not willing to increase cooperation, the quality of the product will
remain at the non-tariff level. Furthermore, if demand conditions were such that
firms were willing to cooperate at 100 percent without a tariff, introducing a tariff
would result in a pure price effect.
17 From section 4.1 we know that an increase in switching costs holding utility constant will result in
an increase in α . The introduction of a tariff represents an increase in switching costs for consumers.
As utility remains unaffected, an increase in t will increase the willingness to cooperate.28
6. Summary
In previous research, R&D cooperation has already been looked at from
many different angles. This paper contributes to this line of literature by presenting a
model of cooperative product development that allows for an endogenous degree of
cooperation. It was shown that demand side conditions could drive firms’ decisions
to cooperate. In particular, firms could raise the quality of a new product by
cooperating in product development. The firms were thus able to increase the value
of the product to the consumer. On the other hand, R&D cooperation led to a higher
substitutability of the final product, which increased competition between firms. It
was shown that firms facing this trade-off might not choose to fully cooperate even
though all consumers prefer the higher quality good. If switching costs can go to
zero, firms will never cooperate at 100 percent.
In addition to the basic model, two modified versions were discussed. If
instead of product market competition firms are allowed to jointly sell the new
product, they will always cooperate to the fullest extent. Depending on demand
conditions, the joint selling arrangement might yield a higher welfare. This is the
case if a large quality gain is possible by cooperation, the gain is important to the
consumer, and firms would not be willing to fully cooperate due to low switching
costs.
The second alternative model introduced tariffs or other additional per unit
costs to the consumer. The reduced competition between the firms under a tariff29
regime has similar effects as the joint selling arrangement. It allows the firms to
raise the price of the new product and to cooperate more intensively in R&D.
Functional forms played a major role in the analysis. Depending on the
specific demand conditions a wide variety of outcomes is possible. In general it can
be said that firms are more willing to cooperate in R&D if competition between them
is reduced. Several conclusions can be drawn from the link between competition and
R&D cooperation. We could expect to see more R&D cooperation in less
competitive industries, controlling for R&D intensity of that industry. If a joint
product development is observed between competitors, this might indicate that the
firms found a way to avoid fierce competition after the development is completed.
On the other hand, it might also be the case that possible quality improvements are
not realized because a high level of competition deters firms from cooperating in
R&D.30
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A3. Appendix
A3.1. Demand functions for firm B
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A B B if pB ≥ pA
A3.2. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 3: Firm behavior under A2
The derivative of the profit function under the assumption that α + = x u and
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At α = 0, setting the derivative equal to zero yields the only real solution
t=0.4662656125x. For t<0.4662656125x, the derivative is negative at α =0. Hence,
firms will not cooperate if t<0.4662656125x.
The derivative of the equilibrium price p* with respect to α is:
) x 2 x 5 t 8 t 4 (
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Therefore, if α =0 and x>3/2t the derivative of the equilibrium price is negative.
Increasing α above 0 will decrease the equilibrium price. Combining the conditions
t<0.4662656125x ! α *=0 and
3
2 t≤ ! p*=pmax at α *=0 yield Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4: Maximum degree of cooperation
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This derivative is negative for all x if t=1, i.e. firms will never choose α *=1 if





0. For all x<xmax the derivative is greater than zero and firms choose to
cooperate 100 per cent.33
Proof of Proposition 5: Welfare comparison under A1
Product market competition
α* = 0.364
Consumer surplus: () 351 . 0
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Recall that the equilibrium price without a tariff is equal to
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A p , p are increasing in tA and tB, respectively.
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A3.3. An Alternative Model of R&D Cooperation
The following model is an alternative approach to the model on cooperative
R&D presented in the main part of the paper. The firms’ interactions are represented
by a “Hotelling” type location model. In this world, consumers are uniformly
distributed along a line of infinite length. Positions on the line correspond to
different product characteristics. A consumer’s position on the line corresponds to
the consumer’s most preferred variety. A consumer demands one or zero units of the
product.
Let t be the distance from the consumer’s most preferred variety to the
nearest variety. The consumer at a distance t from firm i has to pay t γ in addition to
the product price pi, i.e. the “delivered price”
18 is equal to pi+ t γ . Define the “choke
price” ) ( p α as the maximum delivered price any consumer would be willing to pay
for the product. The parameter α is the endogenous degree of cooperation as defined
in section 2.1. of this paper. The choke price ) ( p α is an increasing concave function
of α . The consumer’s demand is one if the price is less than t ) ( p γ − α .T h ef i r m sb e
located at points A and B on the characteristics line with a distance of two units at α
= 0. The distance shrinks to zero at α = 1. The situation is shown in Figure A1.
18 Using quadratic transport cost (or cost of not having the most preferred variety) would be an
alternative formulation that eliminates discontinuities in the model. However, the linear transport cost
approach was chosen to make the model more tractable.36
Figure A1: A Location Model of Cooperation
The lines shown in Figure A1 with the slope γ are the delivered price. A
consumer will buy a unit as long as the delivered price is less than ) ( p α . Thus
beginning at A, the limit of customers served is γ − α = / ) p ) ( p ( t a . In the initial
situation, α = 0 and the firms are located at the maximum distance from each other.
If the firms choose to cooperate, α increases and the goods move closer together.
With the increase in α the choke price increases as well, thus extending the range of
customers served.
In the model, there are two possible competition scenarios. In the beginning
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two, firms are either duopolists or monopolists depending on pa,p b, γ, and p(0).
Note that the condition for a duopoly is that ) 1 ( 2




To solve the second-stage price game and determine the form of competition, two
constrained optimization problems have to be set up. For firm A, the Lagrangian for
the duopoly case is:
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If the constraint is binding, the firms are local monopolists and solve a different
maximization problem. For the monopoly case, we have:
[ ] [ ] b a a a p p ) a ( p 2 ) 1 ( 2 / ) p ) ( p ( 2 p L + + − α − γ λ + γ − α =
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Combining the two problems and solving for the symmetric Nash equilibria yields
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Duopoly ) 1 (
5
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3
7 ) ( p α − γ ≥ α
If firms are local monopolists in the beginning of the game, they could
cooperate and increase ) ( p α without becoming competitors. Therefore, only the
duopoly case is interesting for the analysis of cooperation. To guarantee that the
firms are competing in the beginning of the game when 0 = α , we need ) 0 ( p
7
3 ≤ γ .
Given the linear nature of the problem, it is possible that the duopoly price
equilibrium is not stable for certain α-γ-combinations. When 0 = α and










 − ≤ γ , the best response to the duopoly price is to undercut that
price by ) 1 ( 2 α − γ and to capture the entire market. In order to have a stable duopoly
equilibrium in prices in the case of no cooperation with prices γ + = =
5
2 ) 0 ( p
5
2 p p b a
it is necessary for γ to be in the interval ) 0 ( p 4286 . 0 ) 0 ( p 1315 . 0 < γ < .I ff i r m s
cooperate, i.e. α>0, the lower bound on γ increases.39
In the first stage, assuming the conditions for a duopoly are satisfied, the
firms maximize profit as a function of α taking the price game in the second stage as
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The FOC is:
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1 0 ≤ α ≤
To solve for α, assume a specific strictly concave function ) ( p α of the form
2 ) s s ( x ) ( p α − − = α with x > 0, s > 0 and 0 s x
2 > − . The intercept of this function
with the price axis is equal to the choke price without cooperation ) 0 ( p. T h e
parameter s captures the curvature and reflects how important cooperation is in
raising the choke price relative to ) 0 ( p. T h e m a x i m u m ) ( p α is reached at α=1.
Substituting the specific ) ( p α function into the FOC and solving for α yields the









2 s 2 ≤ γ
0 *= α for
2 s 2 > γ
Second order conditions are satisfied.
For this solution to be stable in the sense that firms will not undercut each
other in the second stage price game, it is necessary that x s 4968 . 0 > γ . In contrast
to the switching cost model this alternative approach results in a concise closed form40
solution. A disadvantage of this model is that there are numerous conditions that
have to hold in order for the solution to be stable. The overall interpretation of the
result is similar to the original model.
The optimal degree of cooperation depends on the curvature of the ) ( p α
function and γ. As expected α is increasing in s because the steeper the ) ( p α
function, the more is to gain by cooperation. The fact that α is decreasing in γ seems
somewhat counterintuitive at first. Firms cooperate more if the market is more
competitive, thus increasing competition even further. In the original model, firms
cooperated more if competition was less intense, i.e. switching costs were high.
However, in the alternative model γ not only captures the intensity of competition
but also the size of the market. With a low γ, firms get more consumers on the side
that they are not competing on. This indicates that the effect of increasing the limit of
consumers served by increasing ) ( p α outweighs the competition effect.